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ASSESSING THE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN ORGANIZATIONAL MANAGEMENT
FACTORS (4Ps) AND A RESILIENT SAFETY CULTURE IN A COLLEGIATE AVIATION
PROGRAM WITH A SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS (SMS)
Daniel Kwasi Adjekum, PhD., CSP.
Department of Aviation
University of North Dakota
Grand Forks, North Dakota. U.S.A
Resilient safety culture is a key factor in sustaining safety management systems
(SMS) in a U.S. collegiate aviation program. The relationships between four
organizational management factors (Principles, Policy, Procedures, Practices)
and a resilient safety culture model based on Reason’s concept was assessed using
an online survey instrument. Structural Equation Model (SEM) technique were
used to assess measurement models of factors underlying a resilient safety culture.
All four management factors had significant predictive relationship with resilient
safety culture. Practices had the weakest predictive relationship with resilient
safety culture and Policy had the highest. Procedures strongly mediated path
between Policies and Practices and there was no significant predictive
relationship between Principles and Practices. Results suggest a good resilient
safety culture within the aviation program even though more focus should be
placed on Practices. Study adds to the paucity of existing literature on resilient
safety culture in U.S. collegiate aviation programs.
A resilient safety culture is a characteristic of an organization that has good safety
procedures and practices which enable it to have greater resistance to incidents and accidents, as
well as being able to cope better when they occur (Hollnagel, Paries, Woods, & Wreathall,
2011). A safety resilient culture is essential for Safety Management Systems (SMS) which is a
formal, top-down, organization-wide approach to managing safety risk and assuring the
effectiveness of safety risk controls. It includes systematic procedures, practices, and policies for
the management of safety risk (ICAO, 2013). Within the scope of an SMS, a resilient safety
culture is known to be reflected in proactive and resilient behaviors of personnel in an
organization and also serves as indirect indicator of good organizational management factors
(Schwarz, Wolfgang, & Gaisbachgrabner, 2016). Resilient safety culture within the aviation
environment has been promoted through extant research (Akselsson, Koorneef, Stewart & Ward,
2009; Reason, 2011; Hollnagel, 2014; Schwarz, Wolfgang, & Gaisbachgrabner, 2016) and the
findings of these research advocate for robust and resilient safety systems as the next level in an
organization with a fully functional SMS program in place. Some collegiate aviation programs in
the U.S. have adopted the SMS voluntary program (SMSVP) facilitated by the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA). The SMSVP provides immense benefits in terms of enhanced proactive
safety risk management and a resilient safety culture sustained in their operations (Adjekum,
2014; Adjekum, 2017). Under the SMSVP, a certificate holder that satisfies all the rigorous
requirements of SMSVP may be recognized by the FAA and designated an active conformance
status (FAA, 2015). A key performance metric of a functional and mature SMS is a resilient
safety culture under all operational conditions (Paries, Macchi, Valot & Deharvenght, 2018).
Measuring resilient safety culture is an essential part of SMS and a path towards continuous
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monitoring and improvements of organizational safety (Stolzer, Friend, Truong, & Aguiar,
2018). Reason (2011) provides a measurement strategy through a conceptual model of a resilient
safety culture engine that drives an organization’s safety program based on the Degani and
Wiener (1991) model of organizational management factors namely; Principles, Policies,
Procedures and Practices (4Ps). The aim of this study was to assess hypothesized measurement
models showing the strength of relationships between a resilient safety culture and 4Ps
management factors in a collegiate aviation program
Research Design & Results
Quantitative survey items modified from Reason’s attributes of a proactive safety
resilient organization (Reason, 2011) were sent via an anonymous online survey link to all
personnel (aviation students, certified flight instructors, faculty, maintenance personnel, dispatch,
administrative, and top-management) in a collegiate aviation program located in the midWestern part of the United States that has an active conformance SMS. The collegiate aviation
program had a population of 1695 and there were 516 responses (~ 31% response rate) at the end
of the survey period which is adequate for most internal online surveys (Tse-Hua & Xitao,
2009). Generally, the response numbers as compared to the non-response suggest minimal
response bias. The results show a mean age of about 23 years (M =22.94, SD = 7.944) the modal
class being the 20-year old respondents and the highest age being 67 years. There were 396 male
respondents (76.7%) as compared to 120 female respondents (23.3%).
Question One
What is the strength of relationships between measurement scale items and their latent
management factors (Principles, Policy, Procedures and Practices)?
Principles. According to Reason (2011), Principles are a corner stone of policy
framework, operational procedures and “sharp-end” practices in aviation organizations. It is
determined by an organization’s management and becomes a conclusive statement on how
operations at the organization is conducted. A resilient safety culture in an organization has an
impact on strategic principles, which may not always be clearly stated but will be inferred from
procedures, policies and practices (Degani & Wiener, 1991). An item under Principles is “Safety
is recognized as being everyone’s responsibility not just that of the safety management team”. A
first-order CFA which allows researchers to test hypotheses about a factor structure (Brown,
2006; 2015) was used in assessing the strength of relationship. The goodness-of-fit index for the
model was χ2 (5, N =516) = 6.048, p = .302, CMIN/DF = 1.210 NFI=.988, IFI=.998, TLI=.994,
CFI=.998, RMSEA = .020 (.000 -.067).
Policy. Reason (2011) suggest that Policy (M= 4.39, SD = .443) guides specifications in
which management describe how certain operations are to be performed. Management will have
policy guidelines that described training, maintenance, line operations and personal conduct etc.
They are developed based on the organization’s strategic principles but further determined by
commercial and operational factors. Example of an item under Policy is “Policies ensure that
supervisory personnel are present throughout high-risk procedures”. The goodness-of-fit index
for the model was χ2 (12, N =516) = 21.916, p = .038, CMIN/DF = 1.826, NFI=.948, IFI=.976,
TLI=.941, CFI=.975, RMSEA = .040 (.009 -.066).
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Procedures. Reason (2011) and Degani and Wiener (1981) suggest that Procedures (M=
4.68, SD = .034) should be developed that are in line with an organization’s principles and policy
framework. Procedures should specify the nature of a task, time and sequence for conducting
task, actions required, sequence of task and required feedback mechanism. The goodness-of-fit
index for the model was χ2 (9, N =516) = 21.473, p = .011, CMIN/DF = 2.386, NFI=.965,
IFI=.979, TLI=.951, CFI=.979, RMSEA = .052 (.024 -.080).
Practices. Reason (2011) suggest that Practices (M= 3.74, SD = .777) are the actual
activities that occur at the ‘sharp-end” of any organization and personnel are responsible for
ensuring that these are in line with standard operating procedures (SOPs). However, deviations
can occur when these actions differ from an organization’s procedure. These deviations can be
minor or major occurrences and, in some cases, lead to an accident. The goodness-of-fit index
for model was χ2 (8, N =516) = 19.623, p = .012, CMIN/DF = 2.452, NFI=.907, IFI=.943,
TLI=.893, CFI=.939, RMSEA = .053 (.023 -.083).
Reliability and construct/discriminant validity. The reliability, convergent validity,
and discriminant validity of the four management factors that relates resilient safety culture were
assessed. A Cronbach’s alpha value of 0.7 or higher indicates good reliability of measured items
(Nunnally, 1978). In addition, a composite reliability (CR) of 0.7 or higher suggests good
reliability and indicating internal consistency exists (Hair, Ringle, & Sarstedt, 2011). Factor
loadings and average variance extracted (AVE) methods were used to assess the convergent
validity (Fornell and Larcker, 1981; Hair et al., 2011). The Heterotrait-Monotrait ratio of
correlations (HTMT) approach with a predefined criterion/ absolute threshold of 0.90 was used
for discriminant validity due to its high sensitivity (Henseler, Ringle, & Sarstedt, 2015). Both
Cronbach’s alpha and composite reliability values for 4Ps indicated acceptable reliability. All the
factors had an AVE ≥ .50 and above suggesting an acceptable convergent validity for the
instrument. The HTMT0.90 result suggests evidence of discriminant validity since the interconstruct correlation ratios were less than the criterion of 0.90.
Question Two
What is the strength of relationships between management factors (Policy, Principles,
Procedures, and Practices) and the overarching construct resilient safety culture in a collegiate
aviation SMS program?
The measured constructs for the four factors were derived by summing the measurement
items in each validated CFA model. The new variables were then used to assess the strength of
relationships with the over-arching concept of resilient safety culture. The analysis yielded a
model with goodness-of-fit index as follows: χ2 (2, N=516) = 5.586; p = .061; CMIN/DF =
2.793; NFI = .985; RFI = .925; IFI=.990; TLI =.951; CFI= .990; RMSEA = .029 (.015 - .057).
Figure 1 shows the final measurement model of relationship between 4Ps and resilient safety
culture.
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Figure 1. Model showing relationship between 4Ps and resilient safety culture (***p < .001)
Question Three
What is the strength of relationships between management factors Policy, Principles, and
Practices when mediated by the Procedures in a collegiate aviation SMS program?
The preliminary analysis of a fully mediated 4Ps measurement model failed to produce
any acceptable fit. A post-hoc iteration was done on the fully mediated 4P safety resilience
model using the modification indices function and a direct path from Principles to Practices was
then removed and a new analysis re-run. The resulting partially mediated model produced a good
fit as shown by the fit index: χ2 (1) = 1.175; p = .278; CMIN/DF = 1.178; NFI = .997; RFI =
.968; IFI=.998; TLI =.995; CFI= .998; RMSEA = .019 (.000 -.119). Figure 2 shows the partiallymediated 4Ps measurement model.
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Figure 2. Partially Mediated 4Ps Measurement Model (*** p < .001; **p <. 005)
Discussions and Conclusion
A strategic management implication of this study is that resilient safety culture is strongly
influenced by the policies, procedures and principles within an organization and periodic
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assessments should be conducted to identify gaps and weaknesses related to these factors that
can adversely affect a resilient safety culture. This aligns strongly with the findings of Akselsson
et al. (2009) on resilient safety culture in air traffic control environment and Reason’s conceptual
framework on resilient safety culture (Reason, 2011). This finding is also consistent with the
need for robust organizational policies and procedures that are primed by a principle that ensure
safe and highly resilient flight operations (Degani and Weiner, 1991). The relatively weak
relationship between Practices and resilient safety culture as compared to the other
organizational factors could be attributed to inadequate awareness of resilient safety practices
within the collegiate aviation program by some respondents which potentially can affect their
perceptions and responses to items related to that factor. An increased focus on resilient safety
practices such as safety empowerment may be expedient as part of the SMS promotion activities.
This allows for cognizance of safety risk in operational environments and authority to suspend
activities when risk exceed tolerable levels required for a task. There was a high correlation
between Policy and Principles that underscores the important role that over-arching principles
have in shaping the policy framework of any organization. The results also support literature that
suggest that Policy framework forges a consistent and pragmatic review of procedures for use by
“sharp-end” employees in an organization. (ICAO, 2013; Stolzer, 2018). The strongest predictive
relationship was between Procedures and Practices. However, Procedures strongly mediated the
path between Policies and Practices, which suggest that without comprehensive procedures
outlining policies, it may be a challenge to sustain resilient practices among “sharp-end”
employees. This finding corroborates Hollnagel (2011; 2014) concept of ‘work as imagined’ and
‘work as done’ as two contrasting ways of understanding Practices at the “sharp-end”. ‘Work as
imagined’ is defined by the Policies and Procedures outlining the way things should work and
represents how program leadership and supervisors believe work happens or should happen.
‘Work as done’, on the other hand, describes the work as carried out by ‘front‐line’ employees at
the ‘sharp end’; in the case of collegiate aviation, how flight students and instructors practically
engage in flight training activities. The finding corroborates suggestion by Schwarz and
Wolfgang Kallus (2015) on a need for resilient safety practices in high operational tempo.
Variations in resilient safety culture practices could be due to organizational conditions created
by those at the ‘blunt end’ (management); the Policies produced, or the way in which standards
for Practices are perceived. The results substantiate Paries et al. (2018) assertion that excessive
attention to SMS formalism (policy, procedures, and traceability) may lead to bureaucratic
processes, often at the expense of focusing on desirable resilient factors such as Practices. It is
therefore essential for collegiate aviation programs to consider seasonal variation within the
flight training environment and calibrate resilient safety culture periodically.
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